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Insider trading law regulates the market effects of
informational and human networks as they relate to
transactions in financial investment instruments known
as securities. Information relevant to securities
transactions moves from person to person in various
ways and in myriad contexts. Those contexts may be
professional or personal, public or private. Regardless,
the information conveyed may incentivize or underlie
purchase or sale transactions in those securities. That is
where insider trading regulation steps in. This article
features a particular insider trading story that helps
illuminate aspects of insider trading regulation in the
United States and behaviors that may generate civil or
criminal liability for violations of U.S. insider trading
law.1
The top-line narrative of the insider trading story
told and examined in this article is exceedingly simple.
The basic asserted facts are as follows:
Criminal enforcement of the federal securities laws, including
those governing insider trading, requires willful conduct. See
15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2018) (authorizing criminal penalties for
enforcement against “[a]ny person who willfully violates any
provision of this chapter . . . or any rule or regulation
thereunder the violation of which is made unlawful or the
observance of which is required under the terms of this chapter
. . . ”). Criminal liability for insider trading also requires the
U.S. government’s satisfaction of its high, “beyond a reasonable
doubt,” burden proof. See, e.g., United States v. Corbin, 729 F.
Supp. 2d 607, 619 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (noting the government’s
“heavy burden to prove each element of illicit insider trading
beyond a reasonable doubt at trial”).
1
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•
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Wife is a finance manager for a corporate
acquiror;
Husband overhears wife talking on the telephone
about a forthcoming acquisition of a specific target
firm;
Wife tells husband there is a trading blackout in
her employer’s equity securities as a result of an
impending transaction; and
Husband buys shares of the target firm’s publicly
traded equity before public disclosure of the target
firm’s acquisition by wife’s employer and nets
$150,000 by selling the shares into the market
after the acquisition is announced.

Based on these facts, the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”) engages in enforcement activity
against the husband. He settles with the SEC in
connection with the announcement of the filing of its
complaint against him (without admitting or denying the
allegations in that complaint).
The SEC’s position? Pure and simple: the
husband’s
transactions
represent
unlawful
misappropriation insider trading, as cognizable under
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as
amended (“Section 10(b)”),2 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated
by the SEC under Section 10(b) (“Rule 10b-5”).3 The
husband deceived the wife by breaching a duty of trust
and confidence he owed to her as his spouse—and the
inadvertent source of material nonpublic information. He
knew or should have known that he was expected to keep
the information he learned from his wife in trust and
confidential and, specifically, that he was to refrain from
trading while that information remained nonpublic.

2
3

Id. § 78j(b) (2018).
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2020).
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Although it may seem difficult to conceive that a
husband would betray spousal trust and good faith in this
manner,4 the case from which the stated facts are
derived, SEC v. Hawk,5 is not unique. In fact, the SEC
announced the filing and settlement of the Hawk case6 at
the same time as the filing and settlement of SEC v.
Chen,7 another SEC enforcement action in which a
husband misappropriated information from his wife. The
related press announcement offered further information
about
past
enforcement
activity
in
similar
circumstances.8
The SEC has brought other insider trading
cases involving individuals who traded on
material,
nonpublic
information
See Greg Farrell, Pillow talk, CHI. TRIB. (Dec 12, 2012),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/opinion/ct-xpm-2012-12-12ct-perspec-1212-couples-20121212-story.html
(“Couples
sometimes share pillow talk about work, of course, but the
wives victimized in these insider cases made it clear they didn't
expect their spouses to trade on it in the morning.”).
5 Complaint, S.E.C. v. Hawk, No. 5:14-cv-01466 (N.D. Cal.),
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2014/comp-pr201461-hawk.pdf [hereinafter Hawk Complaint]; see also S.E.C. v.
Hawk, Litigation Release No. 22957 (March 31, 2014),
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2014/lr22957.htm
[hereinafter Hawk Litigation Release].
6 See Sec’s & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Two Men With
Insider Trading on Confidential Information From Their
Wives, Release #2014-61 (March 31, 2014), https://www.sec.go
v/news/press-release/2014-61#.Uzqzvvk7um6
[hereinafter
Hawk Press Release].
7 S.E.C. v. Chen, Litigation Release No. 22958 (March 31,
2014), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2014/lr22958.
htm.
8 Hawk Press Release, supra note 6; see also Ellen Rosen, Rise
in Insider-Trading Cases Shows the Perils of Pillow Talk, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 24, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/24/b
usiness/24trading.html.
4
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misappropriated
from
spouses. For
example, last year the SEC charged a
Houston man with insider trading ahead
of a corporate acquisition based on
confidential details that he gleaned from
his wife, a partner at a large law firm that
was consulted on the deal. In 2011,
the SEC charged an Illinois man who
bought the stock of an acquisition target of
a company where his wife was an executive
despite her requests that he keep the
merger information confidential. In a
different 2011 case, the SEC charged the
spouse of a CEO with insider trading on
confidential
information
that
he
misappropriated from her in advance of
company news announcements.9
The factual setting of these cases, sometimes referred to
as “pillow talk” cases, 10 compelled a compliance blogger
to quip that, through these cases, “[t]he Securities and
Exchange Commission [had] decided to emphasize that
working wives can be a source of material non-public
information.”11
The Hawk case and the facts reported in the
related complaint and press release beg a number of
questions. These questions emanate from the somewhat
Hawk Press Release, supra note 6.
See, e.g., Farrell, supra note 4; Rosen, supra note 8; Stephen
Taub & Dave Cook, Pillow Talk Gone Wild?, CFO (May 14,
2007), https://www.cfo.com/risk-compliance/2007/05/pillow-tal
k-gone-wild/; Debra Cassens Weiss, Insider Trading by Pillow
Talk?, ABA J. (May 11, 2007), http://www.abajournal.
com/news/article/insider-trading-by-pillow-talk.
11 Doug Cornelius, The SEC Shows Some Respect for the
Working Woman, Compliance Building (March 31, 2014),
https://www.compliancebuilding.com/2014/03/31/the-secshows-some-respect-for-the-working-woman/.
9

10

[166]
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3743939

WOMEN SHOULD NOT NEED TO WATCH THEIR HUSBANDS
LIKE [A] HAWK
15 TENN. J.L. & POL’Y 162 (2020)

attenuated foundation for misappropriation liability,
which itself is rooted in squirrely doctrinal rules, inexact
policy
foundations,
and
theoretical
tensions.12
Importantly, the questions raised by Hawk and cases like
it
offer
opportunities
to
consider
whether
misappropriation insider trading liability, as currently
fashioned, contributes positively to preventing,
correcting, or punishing socioeconomic wrongs.
For example, the SEC’s enforcement action
against Tyrone Hawk (the husband in the Hawk case) is
predicated on the view that Hawk had a fiduciary or
fiduciary-like duty to abstain from trading—or from
otherwise using the information he learned from his wife
for personal market gain—until the material information
in his possession was publicly disseminated and
absorbed. Did Hawk have a fiduciary or fiduciary-like
duty to disclose or abstain? What did he understand
about any trust and confidentiality obligations he had at
the time he decided to trade? “Kinship alone does not
create the necessary relationship.”13
More generally, is Tyrone Hawk’s conduct the
type of conduct that we desire to classify and punish as
wrongful insider trading?14 What harms and benefits
See, e.g., Joan MacLeod Heminway, Martha Stewart and the
Forbidden Fruit: A New Story of Eve, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV.
1017, 1045 (“There is no single unifying theory of insider
trading liability that has been accepted by U.S. lawmakers—
legislative, administrative, or judicial. Moreover, there is no
statute, regulation, or judge-made rule clearly and simply
outlining the conduct prohibited.”).
13 United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 570 (2d Cir. 1991);
see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2(b)(3) (2020) (establishing a
rebuttable presumption that a “duty of trust or confidence”
exists “whenever a person receives or obtains material
nonpublic information from his or her spouse).
14 Professor Jill Fisch asked similar questions nearly 30 years
ago. See Jill E. Fisch, Start Making Sense: An Analysis and
Proposal for Insider Trading Regulation, 26 GA. L. REV. 179,
12
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inure to treating marriages as relationships of trust and
confidence, generally and as a foundation for securities
regulation and liability? To approach those questions and
others like them, it would be useful to know more about
Hawk’s relationship with his wife and the decisions that
he made, culminating in his decision to buy and sell
securities. Did he understand that his trading was or
might be unlawful? If so, why did he buy and sell the
target firm’s public securities and risk damage to his
marital relationship? Why would he risk personal
liability or civil or criminal punishment? Why would he
chance reputational harm and personal shame to himself
and his wife? One judge summarized—in granting
probation to a misappropriating husband (who was a
Lehman Brothers stock broker): “He betrayed the trust of
Lehman Brothers, his responsibility to his profession and
he betrayed the trust of his spouse, all of it completely
tragic and senseless for a sum of money, to his benefit,
that was a rounding error in his compensation.” 15 The
cumulative impacts represent a veritable parade of
horribles that a person typically would not want to
unleash on himself or herself—or his or her spouse. That
a marriage may withstand such trials and tribulations is
remarkable. Because Tyrone Hawk settled the SEC
enforcement action against him16 and few details
currently are publicly available about him or the specific
215 (1991) (“Is the sanctity of the marital relationship really
the basis for . . . [a] determination that . . . [the defendant’s]
conduct constituted insider trading? Should insider trading
prosecutions be a tool to enforce the maintenance of spousal
confidences?”).
15 Farrell, supra note 4.
16 Hawk Litigation Release, supra note 5 (“Hawk has settled
the SEC's charges without admitting or denying the
allegations. He has agreed to the entry of a judgment enjoining
him from future violations of the relevant provisions of the
Exchange Act, and to pay disgorgement and prejudgment
interest of $154,134.50, and an additional penalty equal to his
profits of $151,480.00.”).
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allegations made by the SEC in his case, we may never
know the answers to these questions.
In addition, there is a potential gender story to be
told by looking at insider trading law through the lens of
cases like Hawk. As alluded to in the blogger’s comment
noted above, all of the spousal misappropriation17
enforcement actions reported or mentioned in the press
release announcing the Hawk complaint and settlement
involve husbands misappropriating information from
their wives. Is that representation consistent with an
empirical truth: Do men typically misappropriate
information received from women as opposed to the
reverse?18 If so, why do husbands misappropriate
information from their wives in connection with
securities trading more often than wives misappropriate
information from their husbands? What about gay and
lesbian couples: are there differences in the incidences of
misappropriation in female versus male same-sex
marriages? Are men more risk-taking and women more
References in this article to “spousal misappropriation”
describe a specific type of U.S. insider trading liability that
involves the misuse of information obtained by a spouse
directly or indirectly in the course of the marital relationship.
Spouses may misappropriate cash or other marital assets, but
those misappropriations are beyond the scope of this paper.
See, e.g., Clingerman v. Sadowski, 519 A.2d 378, 381 (Pa. 1986)
(referring to a spouse’s “implied agreement to terminate a
tenancy by the entireties resulting from a misappropriation of
entireties property”); Carol S. Bruch, Management Powers and
Duties Under California's Community Property Laws:
Recommendations for Reform, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 227, 232
(1982) (referring to “compensation for the other spouse's
deliberate misappropriation of community or quasi-community
property.”); Michael Schlesinger, Obtaining Innocent Spouse
Relief in the Face of the Service's Propensity to Litigate, 109 J.
TAX'N 102, 109 (2008) (referring to spousal misappropriation of
“funds intended for the payment of tax”).
18 See infra note 86 and accompanying text.
17

[169]
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3743939

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
VOLUME 15 | AUTUMN 2020 | ISSUE 1

risk-averse? Are women more effectively deterred by
existing regulation than men? Do men and women have
different conceptions of duty or the harm caused by
trading while in possession of misappropriated
information? The U.S. federal securities laws are not
evidently constructed to be gendered in application or
impact. In earlier work, I observed—in the context of
securities fraud more generally—that “there is no
apparent policy-based reason why securities fraud
doctrine should better protect women than men, or men
than women. Neither investor protection nor market
integrity maintenance demand that female and male
investors receive different treatment . . . .” 19 The analysis
provided in this article does not address these or other
gender questions in any direct way. A deeper analysis is
required to fully respond. Nevertheless, gender questions
and differences do exist.20 Their presence and relative
salience may signal, influence, or catalyze changes in the
regulatory landscape and likely underlie congressional,
judicial, and regulatory activity and forbearance in
spousal misappropriation cases and in U.S. insider
trading regulation more generally.21

Joan MacLeod Heminway, Female Investors and Securities
Fraud: Is the Reasonable Investor a Woman?, 15 WM. & MARY
J. WOMEN & LAW 291, 334 (2009).
20 See, e.g., infra note 86 and accompanying text.
21 See Judith G. Greenberg, Insider Trading and Family
Values, 4 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 303, 371 (1998) (“[A]
gender conscious analysis would lead us to reconsider our
approach to both relationships and access to information in
deciding insider trading cases.”); id. at 367 (“Ideas about
gender roles, the family, and the market are important to the
structure of insider trading law in multiple interconnected
ways. . . . [C]ourts decide cases with reference to these gender
roles.”); id. at 368 (“A gender-conscious analysis is . . .
important because it allows us to identify issues in insider
trading law that might otherwise appear to have been
resolved.”).
19
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Finally, in thinking about potential regulatory
consequences flowing from an examination of the Hawk
case and cases like it, it may be useful to know how
common these types of cases are—and how/why they may
be different from other cases involving friend and family
information networks. It may be that the Hawk case, the
Chen case, and the other legal actions involving spousal
misappropriation mentioned in the SEC’s 2014 press
release on the Hawk and Chen enforcement actions,
while not unique, are relatively rare.22 In that event, we
should be cautious about placing too much emphasis on
those cases in suggesting relevant changes to the
regulatory landscape.
This article endeavors to sort through and begin
to resolve key unanswered questions regarding spousal
misappropriation, some of which apply to insider trading
more broadly. It proceeds by identifying and describing
misappropriation insider trading liability under U.S.
law, recounting and analyzing probative doctrine and
policy relevant to spousal misappropriation cases, and
(before briefly concluding) offering related observations
about the impact of that doctrine and policy on the Hawk
case and other spousal misappropriation cases. The
descriptions, analysis, and observations not only reflect
on the Hawk case and what we know about its
background, but also draw on U.S. data from an ongoing
proprietary research project.
I. Misappropriation Cases under U.S Insider
Trading Law
The federal regulation of insider trading in the
United States primarily occurs through the specific
application of general securities fraud precepts under

22

See infra notes 84 & 85 and accompanying text.
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Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.23 Neither the statute nor
the rule gives clear direction to market actors or
regulators. As a result, the developed doctrine is heavily
dependent on decisional law and, to a lesser extent, SEC
rulemaking and guidance.
Unlawful insider trading under Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 can take one of several forms. Each type of
insider trading liability typically requires the breach of a
fiduciary or fiduciary-like duty of trust and confidence.24
See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226 (1980)
(“Although the starting point of our inquiry is the language of
the statute, § 10(b) does not state whether silence may
constitute a manipulative or deceptive device. Section 10(b)
was designed as a catch-all clause to prevent fraudulent
practices.” (citations omitted)); S.E.C. v. Kara, No. C 09-01880
MHP, 2009 WL 3400662, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2009)
(“[I]insider trading inherently involves fraud”); Zachary J.
Gubler, Insider Trading As Fraud, 98 N.C. L. REV. 533, 561
(2020) (“[I]nsider trading law under Rule 10b-5 is based
on fraud”); Kevin S. Haeberle & M. Todd Henderson, Making
A Market for Corporate Disclosure, 35 YALE J. ON REG. 383, 397
(2018) (“Insider trading is mainly restricted by the joint
prohibition on securities fraud found in Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5. Ultimately, those laws stop trading when it involves
deceit.” (footnotes omitted)).
24
See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading
Regulation: The Path Dependent Choice Between Property
Rights and Securities Fraud, 52 SMU L. Rev. 1589, 1590 (1999)
(“Since the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Chiarella, insider trading liability has been based on a breach
of fiduciary duty.”); Sung Hui Kim, Insider Trading As Private
Corruption, 61 UCLA L. REV. 928, 934 (2014) (noting that
“decades ago the Supreme Court originally mandated the
breach of fiduciary duty element for an insider trading
violation and has since maintained that requirement.”); Donna
M. Nagy, Insider Trading and the Gradual Demise of Fiduciary
Principles, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1315, 1324 (2009) (“[U]nder either
of the Supreme Court's theories, the existence of a fiduciarylike relationship is essential.”); Steven R. Salbu, Tipper
Credibility, Noninformational Tippee Trading, and Abstention
23
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This Part I briefly describes each type of insider trading
and contextualizes misappropriation liability within the
overall U.S. insider trading regulation framework.
Classical insider trading involves one or more
transactions in the securities of a firm conducted by a
person who is in possession of material nonpublic
information and owes a fiduciary or fiduciary-like duty of
trust and confidence to the firm’s shareholders.25 The
U.S. Supreme Court explained the rationale for this form
of U.S. insider trading liability as follows:
[S]ilence in connection with the purchase
or sale of securities may operate as a fraud
actionable under § 10(b) . . . . [S]uch
liability is premised upon a duty to disclose
arising from a relationship of trust and
confidence
between
parties
to
a
transaction. Application of a duty to
disclose prior to trading guarantees that
corporate insiders, who have an obligation
to place the shareholder's welfare before
their own, will not benefit personally
through fraudulent use of material,
nonpublic information.26
This duty to disclose material nonpublic information in
one’s possession or abstain from trading until that
disclosure has been made is the bedrock of classical
insider trading liability. Although the typical dutyfrom Trading: An Analysis of Gaps in the Insider Trading
Laws, 68 WASH. L. REV. 307, 311 (1993) (explaining that,
“[w]here there is no express misrepresentation, the fraud must
be inferred from the act of silently trading despite a fiduciary
duty either to disclose the relevant information or to abstain
from dealing in the relevant securities.” (footnotes omitted)).
25 See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 226–30.
26 Id. at 230.
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bearers are officers, directors, and others who work
inside the four walls of the firm, temporary or
constructive insiders—including professionals who work
with the firm—also may be subject to a duty to disclose
or abstain.27 Because the duty holder’s disclosure of the
material nonpublic information without the consent or
participation of the beneficiary of the duty (or other
compelling legal justification) will breach the operative
duty of trust and confidence, the duty to disclose or
abstain effectively is a duty to abstain from trading.
If a person with a duty of trust and confidence
conveys information improperly (in violation of that duty,
including because of the duty holder’s receipt of a
personal benefit) to someone else and the person to whom
the information is conveyed then trades, the
contravention of U.S. insider trading prohibitions under
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is labeled as a tipper-tippee
violation.28 The Court explained U.S. insider trading
proscriptions on tippers and tippees as follows:
Not only are insiders forbidden by their
fiduciary relationship from personally
using undisclosed corporate information to
their advantage, but they may not give
such information to an outsider for the
same improper purpose of exploiting the
information for their personal gain.
Similarly, the transactions of those who
knowingly participate with the fiduciary in
such a breach are “as forbidden” as

See Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646, 655 n.14 (1983) (“Under
certain circumstances, such as where corporate information is
revealed legitimately to an underwriter, accountant, lawyer, or
consultant working for the corporation, these outsiders may
become fiduciaries of the shareholders.”).
28 See id. at 659–64.
27
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transactions “on behalf of the trustee
himself.”29
The U.S. Supreme Court most recently reviewed and
interpreted tipper-tippee liability in Salman v. United
States,30 a 2016 opinion focusing on the nature of a
personal benefit that, when received by a tipper from a
tippee, may support a claim that information was shared
improperly as a matter of U.S. insider trading law.
Misappropriation liability under insider trading
law—the type of liability at issue in the Hawk case—
exists when a person who is in possession of material
nonpublic information and who owes a fiduciary or
fiduciary-like duty of trust and confidence to the source
of the information engages in a securities trading
transaction (or, if we include tipper liability in this
context, improperly shares the nonpublic information) in
breach of that duty of trust and confidence.31 An insider
trading misappropriator
commits fraud “in connection with” a
securities transaction, and thereby
violates § 10(b) and Rule 10b–5, when he
misappropriates confidential information
for securities trading purposes, in breach
of a duty owed to the source of the
information. Under this theory, a
fiduciary’s undisclosed, self-serving use of
a principal’s information to purchase or
sell securities, in breach of a duty of loyalty
and confidentiality, defrauds the principal
of the exclusive use of that information. In
lieu of premising liability on a fiduciary
relationship between company insider and
Id. at 659 (citations omitted).
137 S. Ct. 420 (2016).
31 See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
29
30
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purchaser or seller of the company’s stock,
the misappropriation theory premises
liability on a fiduciary-turned-trader’s
deception of those who entrusted him with
access to confidential information.32
The most recent form of insider trading liability to be
recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court, misappropriation
liability has been somewhat divisive and raises many
legal and practical questions.33
Indeed, misappropriation liability is perhaps the
least known type of insider trading liability and the type
most difficult to conceptualize. Among other things,
misappropriation liability can exist without the
involvement of anyone typically considered to be a firm
insider.34 As a result, it is sometimes referred to as (or
considered a form of) “outsider trading” liability. 35 Its
Id. at 652.
See James J. Park, Insider Trading and the Integrity of
Mandatory Disclosure, 2018 WIS. L. REV. 1133, 1184 (2018)
(“The misappropriation doctrine
has
been controversial
because it extends insider trading regulation beyond the
context of information generated by the corporation.”).
34 See S.E.C. v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 409 (7th Cir. 1991) (“The
misappropriation theory extends the reach of Rule 10b–5 to
outsiders who would not ordinarily be deemed fiduciaries of the
corporate entities in whose stock they trade.”).
35 See, e.g., United States v. Kim, 184 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1012
(N.D. Cal. 2002) (“Misappropriation theory is targeted at
‘outsider’ trading, i.e., breaches that do not involve a duty to
the traded company and its shareholders.”); Ian Ayres &
Stephen Choi, Internalizing Outsider Trading, 101 MICH. L.
REV. 313, 324 n.36 (2002) (“Present mandatory restrictions
against
informed
outsider
trading
include
the
misappropriation theory of insider trading prohibitions and
Rule 14e-3 of the Exchange Act's limits on the ability of any
trader other than the acquirer to trade on nonpublic material
information related to a tender offer.”); Thomas Lee
Hazen, Identifying the Duty Prohibiting Outsider Trading on
32
33
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force derives most specifically from the desire to
encourage capital formation by protecting markets from
harm (rather than by protecting specific investors from
harm in specific transactions).36
Because alleged insider trading misappropriators
are not firm insiders subject to traditional business entity
law fiduciary duties, the establishment of the requisite
duty is key to misappropriation cases.37 Although there
Material Nonpublic Information, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 881, 894
(2010) (“The misappropriation cases provided a case-by-case
rather than systematic analysis of the scope of
the misappropriation theory of outsider trading liability.”);
Kim, supra note 24, at 939 (“[I]nsider trading in violation of
the misappropriation theory—and not the classical theory—is
often referred to as ‘outsider trading.’”); Donna M.
Nagy, Reframing the Misappropriation Theory of Insider
Trading Liability: A Post-O'Hagan Suggestion, 59 OHIO ST. L.J.
1223, 1225 (1998) (“O'Hagan's misappropriation theory now
extends liability under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to cover
such instances of ‘outsider trading . . . .’”); Robert A.
Prentice, Clinical Trial Results, Physicians, and Insider
Trading,
20
J. LEGAL MED.
195,
206
(1999)
(“The misappropriation theory creates what is often called
‘outsider trading’ liability because the liability is based not on
a relationship with the company whose shares are traded but
instead upon a breach of fiduciary duty owed to the source of
the information.”).
36 See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653 (“The misappropriation theory
is . . . designed to ‘protec[t] the integrity of the securities
against abuses by “outsiders” to a corporation who have access
to confidential information that will affect th[e] corporation's
security price when revealed, but who owe no fiduciary or
other duty to that corporation's shareholders.’”) (quoting from
the U.S. government’s brief); id. at 658 (“The theory is . . . well
tuned to an animating purpose of the Exchange Act: to insure
honest securities markets and thereby promote investor
confidence.” (citation omitted)).
37 See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 567 (2d Cir.
1991) (“After Carpenter, the fiduciary relationship question
takes on special importance. This is because a fraud-on-the-
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is a relative “paucity of jurisprudence on the question of
what constitutes a relationship of ‘trust and
confidence,’”38 a number of federal courts have addressed
this element of a misappropriation action in various ways
both before and after the U.S. Supreme Court expressly
endorsed the misappropriation theory in 1997. For
example, a well-cited opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit offers a list of “hornbook fiduciary
relations” that helps guide an analysis of the type of
relationship that, in the event of a violation of fiduciary
duties of trust and confidence inherent in the
relationship, may provide the foundation for a successful
misappropriation insider trading action.39 The listed
relationships include: “attorney and client, executor and
heir, guardian and ward, principal and agent, trustee
and trust beneficiary, and senior corporate official and
shareholder.”40 An additional formative Second Circuit
opinion explains when and why a duty of trust and
confidence owed by an employee to an employer may be
sufficient to support misappropriation liability:
[O]ne may gain a competitive advantage in
the
marketplace
through
conduct
constituting skill, foresight, industry and
the like. . . . But one may not gain such
advantage
by
conduct
constituting
secreting, stealing, purloining or otherwise
misappropriating material non-public
information in breach of an employerimposed fiduciary duty of confidentiality.
source theory of liability extends the focus of Rule 10b–5
beyond the confined sphere of fiduciary/shareholder relations
to fiduciary breaches of any sort, a particularly broad
expansion of 10b–5 liability if the add-on, a ‘similar
relationship of trust and confidence,’ is construed liberally.”).
38 S.E.C. v. Cuban, 620 F.3d 551, 558 (5th Cir. 2010).
39 Chestman, 947 at 568.
40 Id.
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Such conduct constitutes chicanery, not
competition; foul play, not fair play.41
A more recent federal district court opinion analyzed
whether members of a professionally oriented social club
who pledge confidentiality have fiduciary or fiduciarylike duties of trust and confidence to each other that
could provide a foundation for misappropriation insider
trading liability, determining as a matter of law that no
duties of that kind existed. 42 These judicial opinions all
help to frame the origin of duties of trust and confidence
that, if breached in connection with a purchase or sale of
securities, may provide a basis for insider trading
liability.
In 2000, the SEC intervened in the development
of this body of decisional law by adopting Rule 10b5-2,43
which identifies three contexts in which a duty of trust
and confidence exists for purposes of misappropriation
insider trading liability. The three contexts include: (1)
the existence of an agreement “to maintain information
in confidence,”44 (2) a situation in which there is “a
history, pattern, or practice of sharing confidences, such
that the recipient of . . . information knows or reasonably
should know that the person communicating . . . material
nonpublic information expects that the recipient will
maintain its confidentiality,”45 and (3) information
sharing in close family situations—specifically those
United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1031 (2d Cir.
1986), aff'd, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
42 See United States v. Kim, 184 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1013 (N.D.
Cal. 2002) (finding that the relationship between members of
the organization “was not the functional equivalent of a
fiduciary relationship. While the rules of the club may have
forbid defendant's actions, the federal securities laws—at least
in this instance—did not.”).
43 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 (2020).
44 Id. § 240.10b5-2(b)(1).
45 Id. § 240.10b5-2(b)(2).
41
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involving a “spouse, parent, child, or sibling.” 46 The duty
of trust and confidence arising from family relationships
under the rule is qualified in an important way, however.
Specifically:
the person receiving or obtaining the
information may demonstrate that no duty
of trust or confidence existed with respect
to the information, by establishing that he
or she neither knew nor reasonably should
have known that the person who was the
source of the information expected that the
person would keep the information
confidential, because of the parties'
history, pattern, or practice of sharing and
maintaining confidences, and because
there was no agreement or understanding
to maintain the confidentiality of the
information.47
This qualification transforms the rule’s articulated duty
of trust and confidence in the specified family
relationships into a rebuttable presumption.48
Rule 10b5-2 has been challenged in a number of
court opinions, but it has never been invalidated.49 In
Id. § 240.10b5-2(b)(3).
Id.
48 See S.E.C. v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1273 n.23 (11th Cir. 2003);
Mitchell A. Agee, Friends in Low Places: How the Law Should
Treat Friends in Insider Trading Cases, 7 CHARLESTON L. REV.
345, 363 (2013); Bradley J. Bondi & Steven D. Lofchie, The Law
of Insider Trading: Legal Theories, Common Defenses, and Best
Practices for Ensuring Compliance, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 151,
190 n.147 (2011); Hazen, supra note 35, at 896-97; Allan
Horwich, The Clinical Trial Research Participant As an Inside
Trader: A Legal and Policy Analysis, 39 J. HEALTH L. 77, 114
n.132 (2006).
49
See Agee, supra note 48, at 364-65; Joanna B.
Apolinsky, Insider Trading As Misfeasance: The Yielding of the
46
47
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particular, a highly publicized case, S.E.C. v. Cuban,50
required the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
to evaluate whether an oral promise of confidential
treatment made to the chief executive of a corporation by
a significant shareholder of the corporation could be the
source of the requisite duty. Although the district court
found that the SEC could not premise liability in the case
on Rule 10b5-2(b)(1) (which establishes a duty of trust
and confidence based on an agreement to keep
information confidential),51 the Fifth Circuit found to the
contrary.52 At issue in the case was whether the
agreement to keep information confidential also included
an understanding that the recipient was not to trade
while the information remained nonpublic.53 Deciding
that the evidence could support the existence of an
understanding that trading was prohibited, the Fifth
Circuit vacated the district court’s opinion and remanded
the case for further consistent proceedings.54 A jury
eventually found that the recipient of the information

Fiduciary Requirement, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 493, 533 n.264
(2011); Hazen, supra note 35, at 895.
50 620 F.3d 551, 552 (5th Cir. 2010).
51 S.E.C. v. Cuban, 634 F. Supp. 2d 713, 730–31 (N.D. Tex.
2009), (“Because Rule 10b5–2(b)(1) attempts to predicate
misappropriation theory liability on a mere confidentiality
agreement lacking a non-use component, the SEC cannot rely
on it to establish Cuban's liability under the misappropriation
theory.”), vacated and remanded, 620 F.3d 551.
52 620 F.3d 551, 557 (“The allegations, taken in their entirety,
provide more than a plausible basis to find that the
understanding between the CEO and Cuban was that he was
not to trade, that it was more than a simple confidentiality
agreement.”).
53 See supra note 51; 620 F.3d 551, 556.
54 620 F.3d 551, 558.
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was not liable for insider
misappropriation theory.55

trading

under

the

Given the general nature of the three duty-bound
contexts described in Rule 10b5-2, continuing
interpretations of the contours of each of the three can be
expected.56 Moreover, the rebuttable presumption
provided in Rule 10b5-2(b)(3) for intra-family
communications makes it a veritable playground for
litigators at the trial and appellate levels. As a result,
exchanges of material nonpublic information in close
family relationships that precede trades by the recipient
of the information continue to be potential, yet uncertain,
bases for insider trading liability under Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5.

See, e.g., Erin Fuchs, Why The SEC Lost Its Big Case Against
Mark Cuban, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 17, 2013, 3:54 PM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/how-mark-cuban-defeatedthe-sec-2013-10; Andrew Harris & Tom Korosec, SEC Loses as
Mark Cuban Triumphs in Insider-Trading Trial, BLOOMBERG
(Oct.
17,
2013,
7:48
PM
EDT),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-1016/billionaire-mark-cuban-found-not-liable-in-sec-lawsuit;
Jana J. Pruet, Billionaire Mark Cuban Cleared of Insider
Trading; Blasts U.S. Government, REUTERS (Oct. 16, 2013, 3:44
PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-sec-cuban-verdict
/billionaire-mark-cuban-cleared-of-insider-trading-blasts-u-sgovernment-idUSBRE99F0ZM20131016.
56 Hazen, supra note 35, at 897 (“We must await further
judicial clarification . . . before being able to judge whether the
courts will in fact recognize the proper breadth of Rule 10b52.”); Accord, Agee, supra note 48, at 378 (“ . . . [T]he SEC's
attempt to clarify other non-business fiduciary relationships
provides valuable and reasonable parameters that the
Supreme Court has yet to address in a case among friends.”).
55
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II. Spousal Misappropriation
As the general doctrinal survey in Part I
demonstrates, personal relationship contexts, including
marital relationships, present particularly thorny issues
in determining the existence of the duty requisite to
misappropriation insider trading liability. A focused
review of decisional law and regulatory principles
provides important insights into the way that courts and
the SEC have undertaken to resolve these issues.
Ultimately, however, this review illustrates that it is
easy to lose sight of the forest for the trees. A focus on
first principles may offer additional insights that provide
a foundation for further guidance in resolving this
important duty question in spousal misappropriation
enforcement actions like the Hawk case.
A. Decisional Law and Regulatory Principles
Applicable to Spousal Misappropriation
In an influential 1991 opinion, United States v.
Chestman,57 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit took on the specific task of determining whether
spouses owe a fiduciary or fiduciary-like duty of trust and
confidence to each other. In its opinion, the Chestman
court’s analysis begins by noting the need for restraint in
taking the notion of fiduciary and fiduciary-like duties
too far in this context58 and proceeds by articulating two
foundational propositions: that (1) “a fiduciary duty
cannot be imposed unilaterally by entrusting a person
with confidential information”59 and (2) “marriage does
United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 567 (2d Cir. 1991).
Id. at 567 (“[W]e tread cautiously in extending the
misappropriation theory to new relationships, lest our efforts
to construe Rule 10b–5 lose method and predictability, taking
over ‘the whole corporate universe.’”).
59 Id.
57
58
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not, without more, create a fiduciary relationship.”60
Having established these matters, the court then
proceeds to an analysis of whether the marital
relationship at the center of the action was fiduciary or
fiduciary-like.
In summary fashion, the Chestman court finds
that the marital relationship in that case is not a
“traditional” fiduciary relationship.61 This determination
leaves the court with the more difficult analytical task of
determining whether the marriage constituted a
fiduciary-like relationship or more precisely, as stated in
the Chestman opinion, a “similar relationship of trust
and confidence.”62 The court reasons that the relationship
must be “the functional equivalent of a fiduciary
relationship”63 for potential insider trading liability to
attach. As a result, it relies heavily on agency law in
identifying the attributes of a fiduciary relationship to
which aspects of the marital relationship in the case must
then be compared.64
Ultimately, the Chestman court determined that
the husband and wife in the case did not enjoy the
requisite fiduciary or fiduciary-like relationship.65 The
court’s reasoning is summarized in the following
paragraph
from
its
opinion:
Keith’s status as Susan’s husband could
not itself establish fiduciary status. Nor,
Id. at 568.
Id.
62 Id. at 566. This language appears to come from the U.S.
Supreme Court’s opinion in Chiarella v. United States, 445
U.S. 222, 228 (1980) (quoting from the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 551(2)(a) (1976) in referring to “ . . . a fiduciary or
other similar relation of trust and confidence . . . ”).
63 Chestman, 947 F.2d at 568.
64 Id. at 568-70.
65 Id. at 571.
60
61
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absent a pre-existing fiduciary relation or
an express agreement of confidentiality,
could the coda—“Don’t tell.” That leaves
the unremarkable testimony that Keith
and Susan had shared and maintained
generic confidences before. The jury was
not told the nature of these past
disclosures and therefore it could not
reasonably find a relationship that
inspired fiduciary, rather than normal
marital,
obligations.66
In sum, under Chestman, an express request to a spouse
for confidential treatment of material nonpublic
information affecting the market for a security, despite
evidence of other similar confidentiality requests made in
the past, is insufficient to establish the fiduciary or
fiduciary-like duty that, if breached in connection with
the purchase or sale of a security, forms the basis of
insider trading liability under Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5.67
Yet, Chestman was decided six years before the
U.S. Supreme Court endorsed the misappropriation
theory in United States v. O’Hagan.68 The O’Hagan Court
summarizes misappropriation liability as set forth below.
Under
this
theory,
a
fiduciary’s
undisclosed, self-serving use of a
principal’s information to purchase or sell
securities, in breach of a duty of loyalty
and confidentiality, defrauds the principal
of the exclusive use of that information. In
lieu of premising liability on a fiduciary
relationship between company insider and
Id.
Id.
68 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
66
67
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purchaser or seller of the company’s stock,
the misappropriation theory premises
liability on a fiduciary-turned-trader’s
deception of those who entrusted him with
access to confidential information.69
O’Hagan’s depiction of misappropriation liability is
narrowly focused on a fiduciary relationship.70 This is
perhaps unsurprising given that the O’Hagan facts
related to the breach of a private firm attorney’s
obligation of trust and confidence to his law firm partners
and the firm’s client—role-based fiduciary duties (one
legally recognized under business associations law and
the other under agency law and professional
responsibility rules).71 However, what is important in the
Id. at 652.
Id.
71 Id. at 653 (“In this case, the indictment alleged that
O'Hagan, in breach of a duty of trust and confidence he owed
to his law firm, Dorsey & Whitney, and to its client, Grand Met,
traded on the basis of nonpublic information regarding Grand
Met's planned tender offer . . . ”); see MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L
CONDUCT r. 1.6(a) (AM . BAR ASS’N 2016) (providing that,
subject to specified exceptions, “[a] lawyer shall not reveal
information relating to the representation of a client”);
REV. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 404(b)(1) & (c) (1997) (providing,
among other things, that a partner owes a duty to the
partnership and his fellow partners “to account to the
partnership and hold as trustee for it any . . . benefit derived
by the partner in the conduct . . . of the partnership business
or derived from a use by the partner of partnership property”
and to refrain “from engaging in . . . intentional misconduct, or
a knowing violation of law.”) RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY
§ 8.05 (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (“An agent has a duty. . . not to use
or communicate confidential information of the principal for
the agent's own purposes or those of a third party.”); see also
Deborah A. DeMott, The Faces of Loyalty: A Comment on
Hillman, Loyalty in the Firm: A Statement of General
Principles on the Duties of Partners Withdrawing from Law
Firms, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1041, 1042 (1998) (“[A] lawyer
69
70
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O’Hagan Court’s analysis is that the duty—or, more
precisely, the breach of that duty—represents a deceptive
act in connection with a securities trading transaction.
Several spousal misappropriation cases have been
decided since the Court’s decision in O’Hagan.72 Each
addresses the Chestman opinion and, after its adoption
in 2000, Rule 10b5-2(b)(3). For example, in S.E.C. v.
Goodson,73 decided shortly after the adoption of Rule
10b5-2, the SEC prevailed in asserting a potential
fiduciary duty between spouses rooted in Georgia
statutory law.74 The Goodson court also noted that
“Rule 10b5-2(b)(3), which does not apply retroactively,
essentially
creates
a
federal
fiduciary
duty
between spouses for securities law purposes.” 75 A few
years later, in S.E.C. v Yun, a 2003 SEC enforcement
action alleging tipping of information obtained through
spousal misappropriation, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit found that “the SEC presented
evidence upon which a jury could find that a duty of

is . . . an agent of the lawyer's clients and owes fiduciary duties
to them as well as to the firm.”); Susan R. Martyn, In Defense
of Client-Lawyer Confidentiality . . . and Its Exceptions . . ., 81
NEB. L. REV. 1320, 1321–22 (2002) (“Beginning about 100 years
ago, both the attorney-client privilege and the agency duty of
confidentiality became incorporated into lawyer codes as the
obligation not to divulge the confidences and secrets of a
client.”).
72 S.E.C. v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1274 (11th Cir. 2003); United
States v. Corbin, 729 F. Supp. 2d 607 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); S.E.C.
v. Goodson, No. 99CV2133, 2001 WL 819431 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 6,
2001).
73 S.E.C. v. Goodson, No. 99CV2133, 2001 WL 819431 (N.D. Ga.
Mar. 6, 2001).
74 Id. at *3 (“[D]espite defendants' contentions, courts have
repeatedly found that O.C.G.A. § 23-2-58 does create a
fiduciary duty between spouses.”).
75 Id.
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loyalty and confidentiality existed” between the married
couple in that case.76 The court reasoned as follows:
In our view, a spouse who trades in breach
of a reasonable and legitimate expectation
of confidentiality held by the other spouse
sufficiently subjects the former to
insider trading liability. If the SEC can
prove that the husband and wife had a
history or practice of sharing business
confidences,
and
those
confidences
generally were maintained by the spouse
receiving the information, then in most
instances the conveying spouse would have
a reasonable expectation of confidentiality
such that the breach of the expectation
would suffice to yield insider trading
liability.77
In addition, nine years after Goodson and seven years
after Yun, in U.S. v. Corbin,78 the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York concluded that the
marriage at issue in that case was a fiduciary-like
relationship, citing to Chestman.79 The Corbin court also

S.E.C. v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1274 (11th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1272–73.
78 United States v. Corbin, 729 F. Supp. 2d 607 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
79 Id. at 616–7. Specifically, the court stated:
76
77

The Indictment charges that the Devlins had a
spousal relationship that involved the repeated
disclosure of business secrets. Accordingly, the
Court finds that the Government's allegations
fall within the purview of behavior that, as
alleged,
demonstrates
“the
functional
equivalent of a fiduciary relationship.” Thus,
the Court concludes that the Indictment here
alleges a relationship between the Devlins
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found the promulgation of Rule 10b5-2 to be a valid
exercise of SEC authority and determined that the
rebuttable presumption in Rule 10b5-2(b)(3) passes
constitutional muster.80
The foregoing review of judicial opinions and SEC
regulatory pronouncements relating to spousal
misappropriation offers important context. Yet, while
this review reveals that SEC rules and more recent
reported decisional law find or presume a fiduciary-like
duty of trust and confidence in marriage for purposes of
misappropriation liability under Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5, there remains a lack of clarity on that issue. For
example, one law weblog post, in responding to the public
announcement of the Hawk and Chen cases, commented
that the SEC’s assertion of the requisite duty in these
cases represents “a questionable legal theory, and a
continued expansion, beyond all logical bounds, of 10b-5
liability, but a theory that the SEC continues to
pursue.”81 Certainly, without more facts on the nature of
the Hawk’s marital relations over time, it would be
difficult for us to assess the SEC’s probability of success
on the merits in the Hawk case. The unclear nature of the

sufficient to support a prosecution under
misappropriation liability.
Id at 617. (citations omitted).
80 Id. at 617-19; see also S.E.C. v. De La Maza, No. 09-21977CIV, 2011 WL 13174213, at *13-15 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 16, 2011).
81 SEC Expanding the Scope of Insider Trading, THE
SECURITIES LAW BLOG, https://seclaw.blogspot.com/2014/04/sec
-expanding-scope-of-insider-trading.html (last visited April 5,
2020); see also Perino (“Critics charge that enforcers take too
broad a view of such duties and that they expand them to fit
the needs of the actions they want to file. The result is a vague
and uncertain liability standard. These non-traditional duties
of trust and confidence have involved . . . familial relationships
. . . .” (footnotes omitted)).
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requisite duty in the spousal misappropriation context
deserves additional consideration and analysis.
This additional analytical attention is especially
useful because spousal misappropriation cases constitute
an identifiable, recurring subset of insider trading
actions brought by the SEC and the U.S. Department of
Justice.82 Many of these cases, like other legal actions,
never make it to trial or generate published legal
opinions; we have few fully litigated examples from
which we can draw additional descriptive information.83
However, data gathered for an as-yet unpublished study
of friends-and-family insider trading actions brought
over an eleven-year period that includes the Hawk and
Chen cases provides evidence that a relatively small, but
significant, number of these cases are brought.84
Cf. Sec’s & Exch. Comm’n, Selective Disclosure & Insider
Trading, Release No. 7881, 65 Fed. Reg. 51716, 51730 (Aug. 24,
2000) [hereinafter SEC Adoption Release] (“Our experience in
this area indicates that most instances of insider trading
between or among family members involve spouses, parents
and children, or siblings; therefore, we have enumerated these
relationships and not others.”); Sec’s & Exch. Comm’n,
Selective Disclosure & Insider Trading, Release No. 7787, 64
Fed. Reg. 72590, 72602 (Dec. 28, 1999) [hereinafter SEC
Proposing Release] (“We have investigated and prosecuted a
large number of insider trading cases that involved trading by
friends or family members of insiders.”).
83 See SEC Expanding the Scope of Insider Trading, THE
SECURITIES LAW BLOG, https://seclaw.blogspot.com/2014/04/sec
-expanding-scope-of-insider-trading.html (last visited April 5,
2020) (“Unfortunately, because these cases settle, the
questionable legal theory is not being tested.”).
84 The study analyses a propriety data set of publicly available
insider trading cases reported between 2008 and 2018 that
involve information exchanges occurring outside the
workplace—between friends and family. The cases include civil
(federal court and administrative) enforcement actions culled
from a review of SEC litigation releases and complaints and
criminal enforcement actions identified from date-restricted
content-based searches on Bloomberg Law.
Additional
82
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Specifically, seventeen of the 66 friends-and-family
misappropriation cases identified for purposes of the
study involved spousal misappropriation.85 Sixteen of
these seventeen cases involve allegations of husbands
misappropriating information from wives.86 The
recurrent nature of spousal misappropriation cases
requires a look beyond historical judicial and regulatory
pronouncements for answers to the spousal duty
questions raised by these cases.
B. First Principles Applicable to Spousal
Misappropriation
First principles emanating from both insider
trading doctrine and the legal treatment of information
conveyed in spousal relationships outside the insider
trading context hold promise to provide helpful guidance.
information about the data set and the study are available from
the author.
85 The seventeen cases include thirteen federal court actions
brought by the SEC, two administrative court actions brought
by the SEC, and two criminal prosecutions.
86 The sole enforcement action identified in which a wife
misappropriated information from a husband was brought as
an SEC administrative court action. See In re Jo Ann Myers &
Hollis W. Pickett, Jr., Order Instituting Cease-and-Desist
Proceedings Pursuant to Section 21C of the Securities [sic]
Exchange Act of 1934, Making Findings, and Imposing a
Cease-and-Desist Order, Exchange Act Release No. 79581
(Dec. 16, 2016), available at https://www.sec.gov/litigation/
admin/2016/34-79581.pdf.
A separate study similarly
identified husbands as common recipients of information from
wives in insider trading actions, although it did not
differentiate between tipping and misappropriation cases. See
Kenneth R. Ahern, Information Networks: Evidence from
Illegal Insider Trading Tips, 125 J. FIN. ECON. 26 (2017)
(“[C]ompared to non-family associates, husbands are more
likely to be tipped, while wives, sisters, and in-laws are less
likely to be tipped.”).
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Basic assumptions underlying two separate things—U.S.
insider trading law as a type of securities fraud and the
norms of marital relationships—are fundamental to
spousal misappropriation actions. With that in mind, this
Part II.B offers a closer inspection of both (1) suppositions
fundamental to the deception requirement that is at the
heart of misappropriation liability under U.S. insider
trading law and (2) the policy underpinnings of one of the
two testimonial spousal privileges—the privilege
regarding communications between spouses made
in confidence during the course of their marriage—in the
hope that they may offer important insights.
1.
Deception
as
a
Misappropriation Liability

Foundation

for

For insider trading liability to be cognizable under
Section 10(b), there must be either manipulation or
deception.87 Section 10(b) is express on this point; it
makes unlawful the use or employment, in connection
with a securities transaction, of “any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe
as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection of investors.” 88 Misappropriation liability
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2020).
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2018); see also Joan MacLeod
Heminway, Martha Stewart and the Forbidden Fruit: A New
Story of Eve, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1017, 1027–28 (2009). In
a prior work, I described insider trading’s roots in deceptive
conduct as follows:
87
88

[I]nsider trading in the United States is illegal
because it is deceptive as a betrayal of a
relationship of trust and confidence relating to
material nonpublic information about a
corporation or its securities. This kind of
trading deceives those who trust the holder of
the material nonpublic information—those
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is expressly based on deception. 89 Specifically, a
misappropriator deceives the source of information by
using it improperly—in contravention of a fiduciary or
fiduciary-like duty of trust and confidence owed to that
source.90
In essence, “the deception essential to the
misappropriation theory involves feigning fidelity to the
source of information.”91 It represents an intentional
disregard for the confidentiality borne of a trust
relationship—an intentional disregard that is designed
to give the misappropriator an advantage over market
investors.92 Importantly, the Supreme Court has
expressly averred that “the theory is limited to those who
breach a recognized duty.”93
Existing decisional law, as illustrated by the court
opinions described supra Part II.A, does not offer clear
guidance on the extent to which marriage may be the
source of that “recognized duty” in any individual case.
Court opinions part ways on the facts—most particularly
who trust the holder not to use the information
improperly and selectively for his or her or its
advantage.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
89 See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 659 (1997) (“The
misappropriation at issue here was properly made the subject
of a §10(b) charge because it meets the statutory requirement
that there be ‘deceptive’ conduct ‘in connection with’ securities
transactions.”).
90 See id. at 652 (“[T]he misappropriation theory premises
liability on a fiduciary-turned-trader's deception of those who
entrusted him with access to confidential information.”).
91 Id. at 655.
92 See id. at 658–59 (“An investor's informational disadvantage
vis-á-vis a misappropriator with material, nonpublic
information stems from contrivance, not luck; it is a
disadvantage that cannot be overcome with research or skill.”)
93 Id. at 666.

[193]
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3743939

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
VOLUME 15 | AUTUMN 2020 | ISSUE 1

the extent to which there is a pattern of confidential
treatment of business matters in the specific marriage.
Yet, the conduct of a spouse in duplicitously obtaining,
and then disclosing or using, information conveyed or
obtained under circumstances that indicate its nonpublic
nature and confidentiality is a violation of the trust
inherent in an archetypal marriage.94
Section 10(b)’s deception requirement is not
inherently bound to omissions to state material fact in
fiduciary contexts; nothing in the statute itself or in Rule
10b-5 mandates that deception occur in a fiduciary
context. It is in decisional law, as described in Part II.A,
that establishes the requirement of a fiduciary or
fiduciary-like duty in specific contexts. Deception may
therefore be construed to have a more capacious
meaning—one that extends beyond fiduciary or
fiduciary-like duties to obligations of candor and integrity
in wider contexts imbued with extralegal content.95 In
fact, deception has been defined broadly as “the act of
causing someone to accept as true or valid what is false
or invalid.”96 Essentially, deception involves false
pretense—tricking or hoodwinking another—achieved by
See infra Part II.B.2 for an exploration of societal norms and
expectations relating to marital relationships.
95 See, e.g., Stuart P. Green, Lying, Misleading, and Falsely
Denying: How Moral Concepts Inform the Law of Perjury,
Fraud, and False Statements, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 157, 160 (2001)
(“[T]he definition of what constitutes deception in offenses like
mail fraud, securities fraud, and the Model Penal Code's theft
by deception exhibits a much more flexible formal structure
and moral content than ever could have been anticipated at
common law.”);
id. at 182 (noting that “[i]n contrast to perjury and false
declarations—which . . . require both an assertion and literal
falsity—offenses such as fraud . . . reflect a more flexible
concept of deception.”).
96 Deception, Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, https://www.m
erriam-webster.com/dictionary/deception (last visited April 11,
2020).
94
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concealing the full truth from someone through words or
action in a context where complete truth is reasonably
expected. The common law tort of deceit recognizes this
more holistic meaning.97 Although many expressions of
deception in legal causes of action focus on
misrepresentations, concealment of the truth through
omissions (as well as other conduct) also may constitute
actionable deception in various legal contexts.98
The language of Rule 10b-5 certainly allows for a
more all-inclusive approach to defining deception—one
not limited to fiduciary or fiduciary-like relationships.
Although Rule 10b-5(b) expressly governs misstatements
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (AM. LAW INST.1977)
(“One who fraudulently makes a misrepresentation of fact,
opinion, intention or law for the purpose of inducing another to
act or to refrain from action in reliance upon it, is subject to
liability to the other in deceit for pecuniary loss caused to him
by his justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation.”). A
comment to this rule in the Restatement clarifies that “. . .
words or conduct asserting the existence of a fact constitute a
misrepresentation if the fact does not exist.” Id. cmt. B.
98 One legal scholar in this area helpfully explains the range of
deceptive conduct in the following way:
97

Falsehoods are but one way that a person can
cause a false belief in another. Thus false
advertising law recognizes that a literally
truthful advertisement can cause consumers to
draw false inferences; tort law recognizes that
concealing a fact can be as wrongful as lying
about it; and disclosure duties recognize that
the failure to act can also cause false beliefs in
others. The law of deception includes these and
other laws that target deceptive acts and
omissions.
Gregory Klass, The Law of Deception: A Research Agenda, 89
U. COLO. L. REV. 707
708 (2018).

[195]
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3743939

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
VOLUME 15 | AUTUMN 2020 | ISSUE 1

and misleading omissions to state material fact relating
to existing disclosed facts,99 Rules 10b-5(a) and (c)
articulate a wider scope of proscribed conduct.
Specifically, Rule 10b-5(a) makes unlawful “any device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud . . . in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security,”100 and Rule 10b-5(c)
prohibits “any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person . . . in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.”101 While Rule 10b-5(a) is limited to vehicles
used to commit fraud, the use of the terms “would
operate” and “deceit” in Rule 10b-5(c) may implicate even
wider-ranging conduct related to transactions in
securities. Notably, the SEC’s complaint in the Hawk
case alleges violations of all three clauses of Rule 10b5.102
Context is therefore important.103 Deception
underlies, pervades, and cuts across numerous different
types of legal rules and claims, both civil and criminal.104
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2020).
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a).
101 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(c).
102 Hawk Complaint, supra note 5, at ¶ 17.
103 John Bliss, The Legal Ethics of Secret Client Recordings, 33
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 55, 68 (2020) (“[D]eceit is difficult
to define without context.”).
104 See, e.g., Green, supra note 95, at 159 (offering “an account
of the structural and moral differences among three different
kinds of deception” common to legal and moral wrongs);
Gregory Klass, Meaning, Purpose, and Cause in the Law of
Deception, 100 GEO. L.J. 449, 452 (2012) (identifying,
examining, and applying “three methods the law uses to
regulate deception between private parties, which correspond
to three types of laws of deception: interpretive, purpose-based,
and causal-predictive.”). Klass collectively labeled the myriad
laws in this area “the law of deception,” discussing the laws
which “address the flow of information between private
parties,” further stating,
99

100
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Judicial opinions in misappropriation actions brought
under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 can and should
recognize and accept broad notions of deception to the
extent that they serve the policy objectives underlying
the misappropriation theory—namely, promoting market
integrity as a means of encouraging investment
activity.105 “[U]sing misappropriated information could
thereby create liability, not because a duty to disclose has
been imposed but because use of the information is
deceptive in and of itself.”106
Broader notions of deception are sometimes
present in decisional law under Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5, although the Supreme Court has not specifically
endorsed them in the insider trading context.
Significantly, Supreme Court jurisprudence does
recognize the importance of candor in federal securities
law, noting that “[a] fundamental purpose, common to
these statutes, was to substitute a philosophy of full
Familiar examples include the torts of deceit,
negligent misrepresentation, nondisclosure,
and defamation; criminal fraud statutes;
securities law, which includes both disclosure
duties and penalties for false statements; false
advertising law; labeling requirements for food,
drugs, and other consumer goods; and,
according to recent scholarship, informationforcing penalty defaults in contract law and
elsewhere. Taken together, these and similar
laws constitute what I will call the “law of
deception.” They regulate the flow of
information between private parties to prevent
dishonesty, disinformation, artifice, cover-up,
and other forms of trickery, or to avert mistake,
misunderstanding, miscalculation, and other
types of false belief.
Id. at 449–50.
105 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
106 Apolinsky, supra note 49, at 525.
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disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor.”107 As an
implementation of that philosophy of full disclosure,
some lower federal courts have begun to embrace the
inherent and potential breadth of deception in the insider
trading context.108
For example, in S.E.C. v. Rocklage,109 a wife fully
disclosed to her husband her intention to inform her
brother
of
material
nonpublic
information
misappropriated from the husband, which would, based
on Supreme Court dicta in the O’Hagan opinion,110
seemingly foreclose misappropriation liability because of
a lack of deception. The Rocklage court acknowledged
this impediment to the SEC’s case. 111 Yet, the court’s
Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Capital Gains Research Bureau,
Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963) (emphasis omitted).
108 See Nagy, supra note 24, at 1340 (“Although several lower
courts have adhered strictly to the Supreme Court's dictate
that insider trading liability must be predicated on deception
by a fiduciary, a growing number of courts simply disregard
this fiduciary dictate when it forecloses liability against a
defendant who has traded securities based on wrongfully
obtained information.” (footnote omitted)).
109 470 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2006).
110 See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 655 (1997)
(“[F]ull
disclosure
forecloses
liability
under
the
misappropriation theory: Because the deception essential to
the misappropriation theory involves feigning fidelity to the
source of information, if the fiduciary discloses to the source
that he plans to trade on the nonpublic information, there is no
‘deceptive device’ and thus no § 10(b) violation . . . .”).
111
Rocklage, 470 F.3d at 8.
The court’s specific
acknowledgement included a reference to the O’Hagan opinion:
107

Had Mrs. Rocklage never made any disclosure
of her intent to tip her brother, there would
have been deception in connection with a
securities transaction when she did tip her
brother, without her husband's consent, to
enable her brother to trade in securities.
Under O'Hagan, this would have been the case
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opinion in Rocklage further recognized that the timing of
the wife’s disclosure to the husband (after he already had
afforded her the information in confidence) in
combination with the wife’s preconceived plan to make
the information available to her brother did constitute
the requisite deception.
[B]efore her husband's initial disclosure
about the clinical trial, Mrs. Rocklage did
absolutely nothing to correct his mistaken
understanding that she would keep the
trial results confidential. This was so even
though Mrs. Rocklage knew that her
husband had this (mis)understanding, and
even though she had a preexisting
arrangement
to
disclose
certain
confidential information to her brother.112
Ultimately, the Rocklage court expressly found that,
although the wife’s tip was not deceptive under the
reasoning set forth in O’Hagan, her acquisition of the
information from her husband—an independent course of
conduct from the associated tipping of her brother—was
deceptive.113
Broad-based notions of deception also have begun
to influence legal scholarship on insider trading. In
particular, Professor Donna Nagy has argued
compellingly that deception can occur outside the
construct of fiduciary and fiduciary-like duties.114 She
irrespective of the means by which Mrs.
Rocklage acquired the information.
Id.
Id. (“We agree that this acquisition of information was
deceptive.”).
114 Nagy, supra note 24; see also Apolinsky, supra note 49, at
522 (“[T]he fiduciary relationship is no longer the sine qua non
of insider trading liability—other kinds of relationships
112
113
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suggests, on the basis of Rocklage and other cases
founded in deception that may be deemed to be outside
the context of fiduciary and fiduciary-like relationships,
that “courts could recognize an insider trading theory
based on the deceptive acquisition of confidential
information.”115 She points out that this theory, while
used in Rocklage in a misappropriation context,
represents a broader liability scheme not necessarily
confined to misappropriation cases.116 Nevertheless, the
deceptive acquisition theory of liability is useful in the
spousal misappropriation setting where confidentiality
may well be expected, even if that confidentiality is not
borne of a legally recognized fiduciary or fiduciary-like
relationship. It illustrates an important application of
broader notions of deception in the spousal
misappropriation context.
2. The Policy Underlying Spousal Privilege
An additional first principle—one relating to
information
conveyed in
spousal
relationships
generally—also is in play in spousal misappropriation
cases. Specifically, marital relationships enjoy distinctive
treatment under federal and state rules of evidence
because of their innate capacity to include confidential
communications. This distinctive treatment exists in the
form of a spousal confidential communications privilege
that proscribes testimony about confidential marital
communications.117 This marital privilege is one of two
implicate the broader policies of section 10(b) and Rule 10b5.”).
115 Nagy, supra note 24, at 1322.
116 Id. at 1369 (“[A] theory of deceptive acquisition is
analytically distinct from the misappropriation theory
endorsed in O’Hagan.”
117 See Naomi Harlin Goodno, Protecting “Any Child”: The Use
of the Confidential-Marital-Communications Privilege in
Child-Molestation Cases, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 3 (2010);

[200]
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3743939

WOMEN SHOULD NOT NEED TO WATCH THEIR HUSBANDS
LIKE [A] HAWK
15 TENN. J.L. & POL’Y 162 (2020)

recognized under the Federal Rules of Evidence as
common law marital privileges.118
At the outset, the two spousal privileges were not
seen as separate. The U.S. Supreme Court first
recognized a spousal privilege in 1839 in Stein v.
Bowman,119 a legal action in which a wife was called to
testify about facts relating to communications with her
husband, who was no longer alive at the time of the trial
in the case. In its opinion, the Court expressly
acknowledged that “[i]t is a general rule that neither a
husband nor wife can be a witness for or against the
other. This rule is subject to some exceptions; as where
the husband commits an offence against the person of his
wife.”120 The Stein Court noted specifically what later
were recognized as the two distinct spousal privileges:
“[T[he wife is not competent, except in cases of violence
upon her person, directly to criminate her husband; or to

Katherine O. Eldred, Comment, “Every Spouse’s Evidence”:
Availability of the Adverse Spousal Testimonial Privilege in
Federal Civil Trials, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1319, 1319–20 (2002).
118 See generally FED. R. EVID. 501 (providing, subject to
exceptions for express constitutional, statutory, or court rules
to the contrary, that “[t]he common law—as interpreted by
United States courts in the light of reason and experience—
governs a claim of privilege . . . .”). The second of the two
common law marital privileges currently recognized is “the
adverse spousal testimonial privilege, also known as the antimarital facts privilege” which applies, at least in criminal
proceedings, regardless of the confidential nature of the
spousal communications. Eldred, supra note 117, at 1319–20;
see also Goodno, supra note 117, at 3. The two privileges are
distinct and individually applicable, based on context. See
Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 14 (1934) (“[T]he privilege
with respect to communications extends to the testimony of
husband or wife even though the different privilege, excluding
the testimony of one against the other, is not involved.”).
119 38 U.S. 209 (1839).
120 Id. at 221 (citations omitted).
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disclose that which she has learned from him in
their confidential intercourse.”121
Although various policy rationales for the spousal
privilege have been forwarded over time, the privilege
itself, as articulated in Stein, recognizes the
confidentiality of information conveyed in marital
relationships—“the confidence that subsists between
husband and wife.”122 The Stein Court explained its
understanding of the policy roots of the spousal privilege
in the following way:
This rule is founded upon the deepest and
soundest principles of our nature.
Principles which have grown out of those
domestic relations, that constitute the
basis of civil society; and which are
essential to the enjoyment of that
confidence which should subsist between
those who are connected by the nearest
and dearest relations of life. To break down
or impair the great principles which
protect the sanctities of husband and wife,
would be to destroy the best solace of
human
existence.123

Id. at 222; see also Eldred, supra note 117, at 1334 (footnote
omitted) (“The Stein rule combined spousal incompetence to
testify with a privilege rule that appears to match with the
modern confidential communications privilege. American law
had not yet separated a confidential communications privilege
from an adverse testimonial privilege.”).
122 Stein, 38 U.S. at 223. Although many cases refer to spouses
as husband and wife, it should be noted that the U.S. Supreme
Court has recognized same-sex marriages and expressly noted
that the spousal privilege is a right attendant to marriage. See
Obergefell v. Hodges, No. 14–556, slip op. at 16–17 (U.S. June
26, 2015).
123 Stein, 38 U.S. at 223; see also Eldred, supra note 117, at
1323
n.28
(“The
policy
justifications
for
the
121
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This policy rationale offers insights into the
reasonable expectations of a marital relationship. It is
expected to be a relationship in which confidences can be
and are enjoyed, and there is a societal benefit to be
gained from preserving that bond of trust and
confidence.124
In fact, some courts—including the U.S. Supreme
Court—have expressly acknowledged that confidentiality
is presumed in marital relationships. In 1951, for
example, the Court expressly averred that “marital
communications are presumptively confidential.”125 The
presumption is, however, rebuttable by the litigant
seeking to introduce the testimony.126 In an earlier case,
spousal confidential communications privilege in American
law are much the same as for the others: the privilege is needed
to encourage marital confidences, which in turn promotes
marital harmony.”).
124 See, e.g., Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 77
(1958), holding modified by Trammel v. United States, 445
U.S. 40 (1980) (“The basic reason the law has refused to pit wife
against husband or husband against wife . . . was a belief that
such a policy was necessary to foster family peace, not only for
the benefit of husband, wife and children, but for the benefit of
the public as well.”); Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 14
(1934) (citations omitted) (“The basis of the immunity given to
communications between husband and wife is the protection of
marital confidences, regarded as so essential to the
preservation of the marriage relationship as to outweigh the
disadvantages to the administration of justice which the
privilege entails.”); State v. Freeman, 276 S.E.2d 450, 453
(N.C. 1981) (footnote omitted) (“[S]pouses shall be incompetent
to testify against one another in a criminal proceeding only if
the substance of the testimony concerns a ‘confidential
communication’ between the marriage partners made during
the duration of their marriage. This holding allows marriage
partners to speak freely to each other in confidence . . . .”).
125 Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332, 333 (1951).
126 Id. (noting that “The Government made no effort to
overcome the presumption.”); see also Goodno, supra note 117,

[203]
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3743939

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
VOLUME 15 | AUTUMN 2020 | ISSUE 1

the Court first noted the presumption and its rebuttable
nature.
Communications between the spouses,
privately made, are generally assumed to
have been intended to be confidential, and
hence they are privileged; but wherever a
communication, because of its nature or
the circumstances under which it was
made, was obviously not intended to be
confidential it is not a privileged
communication.127
The presumption of confidentiality in a marriage stems
from the bond of trust commonly generated and assumed
to exist in a marriage and is an integral incentive to full
disclosure.128
Support for the spousal privilege relating to
confidential communications has not been consistent or
uniform, however. Some may, in fact, believe it is eroding.
In 1975, in eliminating this privilege from express
codification in the Federal Rules of Evidence, “the
Advisory Committee reasoned that because most married
couples were unaware of the marital-communications
at 10 (“[T]he party seeking to introduce the privileged
communication bears the burden to overcome this
presumption.”).
127 Wolfle, 291 U.S. at 14 (1934).
128 Courts allude to the confidential, trusting nature of a
marriage relationship in various contexts outside the spousal
privilege. See, e.g., Beller v. Tilbrook, 571 S.E.2d 735, 736 (Ga.
2002) (citations omitted) (“As husband and wife, Beller and
Tilbrook enjoyed a confidential relationship. Thus, Tilbrook
was entitled to repose confidence and trust in Beller.”); Miller
v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 501 P.2d 1063, 1067–68 (Wash.
1972) (“The relationship of trust and confidence which
is presumed to exist between spouses should result in their
mutual disclosure inter se of all matters pertaining to
community property . . . .”).
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privilege, it probably had little influence on how spouses
conducted themselves inside the marriage.”129 Moreover,
New Mexico recently judicially abolished its codified
spousal communication privilege.130 In doing so, the New
Mexico Supreme Court used relatively strong language
asserting the lack of a foundation for the rule in current
times.
This Court has a constitutional duty to
ensure that the pursuit of truth is not
unduly undermined by a procedural rule
that has outlived its justification. Having
carefully
examined
the
spousal
communication privilege, we cannot accept
that it meaningfully encourages marital
confidences, promotes marital harmony, or
produces any substantial public benefit
that justifies its continued recognition.
Rather, we believe that the privilege is a
vestige of a vastly different society than
the one we live in today and has been
retained in New Mexico simply through
inertia.131
In dissenting from this part of the New Mexico Supreme
Court’s opinion, one of the justices reaffirmed the policy
justifications for the privilege.132

Goodno, supra note 117, at 11.
State v. Gutierrez, No. S-1-SC-36394, 2019 WL 4167270, at
*9 (N.M. Aug. 30, 2019).
131 Id.
132 Id. at *17 (Vigil, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
(“As a solemn vow of unity, marriage creates for many a sacred
space to share oneself with a chosen other. That space should
remain free from state intrusion and compulsion that would
demand one spouse to reveal the intimate secrets of the
other.”).
129
130
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Nevertheless, the long history of the spousal
confidential communications privilege and its relatively
strong roots in the presumed existence of a relationship
of trust and confidence between spouses offers us another
lens for inspection of spousal misappropriation cases
under U.S. insider trading law. The relationship between
spouses may not be fiduciary or fiduciary-like, but its
status as a relationship of trust and confidence is well
embedded in the law of evidence through the spousal
communications privilege. The lengthy, relatively strong
heritage of that privilege provides indirect support in
judicial efforts to confidently move beyond the Chestman
court’s narrow view of the type of relationships that
generate a duty of trust and confidence in spousal
misappropriation cases.133
III. The Hawk Case and U.S. Insider Trading
Regulation
The foregoing summaries of existing decisional
law and regulation and related inquiries into deception
and spousal privilege are highly relevant to the Hawk
case and others like it. Although the applicable law and
regulation have begun to provide more clarity regarding
the existence of a fiduciary-like duty of trust and
confidence in marital relationships for purposes of
misappropriation liability under existing interpretations
of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, doubt lingers. Much of
the doubt can be attributed to the fact that the regulatory
presumption of the requisite duty under Rule 10b5-2 is
rebuttable and the grounds for the rebuttal remain
relatively untested. However, the overall uncertainty in
spousal misappropriation cases is undoubtedly
exacerbated by, among other things, lingering
ambivalence about (and, indeed, some hostility toward)
the misappropriation theory of U.S. insider trading
133

See supra notes 62–66 and accompanying text.
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liability as ordained by the U.S. Supreme Court in
O’Hagan and uncertainty about the nature and scope of
relevant spousal confidentiality obligations under the
Second Circuit’s Chestman opinion, which took a narrow
view of the spousal duty required to constitute the
requisite deception for insider trading liability.
In the absence of new decisional law and
additional SEC guidance, this article offers and develops
two additional ways to ponder and instigate future
doctrinal development. They involve delving deeper into
the contextual meaning of deception as the doctrinal
basis for misappropriation liability and looking at
decisional law and policy relating to marital
relationships in a different legal context: the spousal
confidential communications privilege in the law of
evidence. Deception and the marital context are critical
elements of
the puzzle surrounding
spousal
misappropriation. The resulting insights offer bases for
both expanding spousal misappropriation liability
beyond fiduciary-like relationships and substantiating a
relatively strong presumption of trust and confidence in
marital relationships.
A more comprehensive, searching exploration of
the potential contours of the deception element of a claim
under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 offers opportunities
to re-evaluate the requirement of a fiduciary or fiduciarylike duty of trust and confidence as a precursor to spousal
misappropriation (and other) liability under U.S. insider
trading law. Although the breach of a duty of trust and
confidence is accepted and understood as a deceptive
practice, other conduct connected to the purchase or sale
of a security also may be deceptive. In particular, the
acquisition of material nonpublic information may occur
by deceptive means. The Hawk case provides an example
of a non-consensual, and likely deceptive, acquisition of
information from a spouse in connection with securities
trading.
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The SEC’s complaint against Tyrone Hawk
alleged that he both overheard134 and was the express
recipient of135 material nonpublic information relating to
a possible near-term acquisition by his wife’s employer.
The information overheard apparently was acquired
covertly; his wife did not knowingly elect or expect to
share it with him. The information expressly imparted to
him, which related to a trading blackout concerning the
stock of his wife’s employer due to a pending acquisition,
indicates both the confidential nature of any information
he may have obtained about the acquisition and its
important connection to securities trading. Yet, according
to the SEC’s complaint, Tyrone Hawk nevertheless
purchased securities in the target firm while in
possession of that material nonpublic information 136—
information he had surreptitiously acquired from his wife
and knew was material, nonpublic, and confidential. He
later sold those securities for a profit.137 Tyrone Hawk’s
alleged conduct deceived his wife because he
affirmatively concealed his furtively gained knowledge
and trading intentions from his wife under circumstances
in which she reasonably expected that he understood the
strictly confidential nature of any information he might
have about the acquisition.138 Tyrone Hawk’s conduct
Hawk Complaint, supra note 5, at ¶ 1. The complaint also
alleges that additional information may have become
“available to Hawk because his wife frequently worked from
home.” Id. at ¶ 11.
135 Id. at ¶¶ 1, 11.
136 Id. at ¶¶ 1, 12.
137 Id. at ¶¶ 1, 13.
138 The SEC alleged from these facts that Tyrone Hawk “was
expected to maintain in confidence the nonpublic information”
concerned the acquisition. Id. at ¶14. Although the SEC’s
allegation in this regard was based on the existence of a
fiduciary or fiduciary-like duty owed by Tyrone Hawk to his
wife, this expectation of confidence remains a salient
observation based on the underlying facts alleged, even
independent of that duty.
134
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should be recognized as deceptive under the
misappropriation theory of U.S. insider trading liability,
regardless of whether the duty he owed to his wife is
fiduciary or fiduciary-like in nature. A failure to
recognize deception in spousal misappropriation cases
erodes market integrity in the same way that allowing a
trade or affirmative tip by the wife would, even though
the deceived person is different.
Parenthetically, it would seem that the investing
public reasonably expects confidentiality to be
maintained in these circumstances. A husband should
not be able to engage in securities trading or related
activities prohibited as to the wife, or vice versa.
However, misappropriation liability as currently
conceived does not expressly recognize the expectation of
market participants. Rather, it recognizes deception of
the source of information.
At its core, spousal misappropriation liability is
concerned with more than deception, however. It involves
assessment of the institution of marriage. There may be
marriages in which established norms of trust and
confidence do not exist. This raises the question of
whether, under existing misappropriation law, deception
should always be found when a spouse either acquires or
uses material nonpublic information obtained from a
spouse without consent.
An analysis of the policy underpinnings of the
spousal confidential communications privilege offers
support for the SEC’s adoption of a regulatory
presumption of a fiduciary-like spousal duty of trust and
confidence. The SEC’s proposing and adoption releases
for Rule 10b5-2 do not expressly mention the spousal
communications privilege.139 However, the proposing
See SEC Adoption Release, supra note 82; SEC Proposing
Release, supra note 82. Interestingly, few reported insider
trading opinions mention the spousal privilege. See, e.g.,
United States v. Pinto-Thomaz, 352 F. Supp. 3d 287, 309 n.12
139
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release touches on common ground with that spousal
privilege in the following passage justifying the SEC’s
choice of spousal relationships, among other family
relationships, for special treatment in establishing the
duty of trust and confidence necessary to liability in
misappropriation cases:
Our enforcement experience demonstrates
that these are the relationships in which
family members most commonly share
information with a legitimate expectation
of trust or confidentiality. These also are
normally the types of close familial
relationships in which the parties have a
history, pattern, or practice of sharing
confidences that would lead to a
reasonable
expectation
of
confidentiality.140
Thus, the rebuttable presumption set forth in Rule 10b52(b)(3)—that a duty of trust and confidence is
presupposed in a spousal relationship—appears to be
founded on the same or a substantially similar
understanding of the marital relationship as the spousal
privilege relating to confidential communications
established under the rules of evidence.141
(S.D.N.Y. 2018), reconsideration denied, No. S2 18-CR-579
(JSR), 2019 WL 1460216 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2019); S.E.C. v.
Melvin, No. 1:12-CV-2984-CAP, 2014 WL 11833265, at *4
(N.D. Ga. Feb. 19, 2014); S.E.C. v. De La Maza, No. 09-21977CIV, 2011 WL 13174213, at *3 n.2 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 16, 2011).
140 SEC Proposing Release, supra note 82, at 72604 (footnote
omitted).
141 Cf. Charles W. Murdock, The Future of Insider Trading
After Salman: Perpetuation of a Flawed Analysis or a Return to
Basics, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 1547, 1581 (2019) (asking, in decrying
the Second Circuit's view of marriage in the Chestman opinion,
how the court would “explain the marital privilege that one
spouse need not testify against another”).
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Assumed confidential relations in marriage—a
trust relationship—provide a key, basic foundation for
the spousal confidential communications privilege. The
existence of communications shared exclusively in a
legally valid marriage must be proven to initially invoke
the privilege. If credit is given to the presumed existence
of trust and confidence in marital relations in one area of
legal inquiry (evidentiary rules), it seems anomalous to
fail to give credit to the same presumption of trust and
confidence in another area of legal inquiry (insider
trading regulation), even if underlying policy may give
different credence to the trusting and confidential nature
of that relationship in context. It is important to note
that the spousal communications privilege does not exist
only for personal or familial (as opposed to business or
professional) information shared in a marriage.142
Although a specific allegation as to the legally
valid nature of Tyrone Hawk’s marriage is not included
in the SEC’s complaint in its insider trading enforcement
action against him, the complaint otherwise alleges facts
sufficient to suggest the applicability of the spousal
confidential communications privilege.143 These same
facts should be sufficient to effectively assert the
presumed duty of trust and confidence under Rule 10b52(b)(3) for purposes of misappropriation liability under
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. A tortured judicial or
regulatory analysis of the fiduciary-like nature of that
duty should not be required.144 This was the SEC’s
This is noted because the Chestman court placed emphasis
in its opinion on the absence of a “repeated disclosure of
business secrets between family members.” United States v.
Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 569 (2d Cir. 1991).
143 See Hawk Complaint, supra note 5, at ¶¶ 1, 2, 10, 11, 12, 14,
15 (mentioning the husband-wife relationship between Tyrone
Hawk and his wife as it relates to other factual allegations
relevant to the case).
144 One scholar notes a judicial conflation of fiduciary and
confidential relationships in the marriage context. Barbara A.
142
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essential purpose in proposing the adoption of Rule 10b52(b)(3).145 In its adoption release, the SEC articulated two
key benefits associated with adoption of the rule.
First, the rule will provide greater clarity
and certainty to the law on the question of
when a family relationship will create a
duty of trust or confidence. Second, the
rule will address an anomaly in current
law under which a family member
receiving material nonpublic information
may exploit it without violating the
prohibition against insider trading. By
addressing this potential gap in the law,
the rule will enhance investor confidence
in the integrity of the market.146
The SEC’s adoption of Rule 10b5-2 sensibly aligns the
marital relations policy underpinnings for spousal
misappropriation with those for the spousal confidential
communications privilege.
The combined forces of this policy alignment and
a broad interpretation of Section 10(b)’s deception
requirement compel recognition of and respect for the
presumption of a spousal duty of trust and confidence as
a basis for spousal misappropriation liability under
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Thus, the regulatory
Atwood, Marital Contracts and the Meaning of Marriage, 54
ARIZ. L. REV. 11, 26 (2012) (footnotes omitted) (“In disputes
over marital agreements, courts frequently expound on the
meaning of marriage as a “confidential” or “fiduciary”
relationship. While the terms carry distinct meanings in trust
law, they are often used interchangeably when used to describe
the special nature of the marital relationship.”).
145 See SEC Proposing Release, supra note 82, at 72602 (noting
that the Chestman decision leads to anomalous results that
Rule 10b5-2(b)(3) is intended to correct).
146 SEC Adoption Release, supra note 82, at 51734.
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presumption in Rule 10b5-2(b)(3) should be accorded due
deference. Moreover, rebutting the presumption should
require a high threshold level of evidentiary proof.
Specifically, to effectively rebut the presumption, the
defendant spouse should be compelled to produce
evidence establishing that the spousal source of the
material nonpublic information was not deceived in
either the acquisition of that information by the
defendant spouse or its use by the defendant spouse in
tipping or trading.
Overall, the analysis forwarded in this article
demonstrates that, under current U.S. insider trading
law, a spouse should not be able to obtain material
nonpublic information from a spouse and lawfully engage
in securities trading or tipping of that information to
others without affirmatively justifying those actions to a
trier of fact. Decisional law should recognize that, absent
unusual countervailing facts, either the clandestine or
underhanded acquisition of material nonpublic
information from a spouse or undisclosed trading or
tipping while in possession of material nonpublic
information obtained from a spouse constitutes the
deception necessary to misappropriation liability under
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. This conception of
deception recognizes that “[t]he intimacy inherent in the
marriage relationship demands trust and results in the
exchange of information.”147
IV. Conclusion
Spousal misappropriation cases like S.E.C. v.
Hawk have generated numerous questions and analytical
difficulties for litigants, jurists, and regulators. This
Meghan McCalla, The “Socially Endorsed, Legally Framed,
Normative Template”: What Has in Re Marriage Cases Really
Done for Same-Sex Marriage?, 1 EST. PLAN. & COMMUNITY
PROP. L.J. 203, 226 (2008).
147
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article offers a specialized legal analysis of these
recurrent insider trading scenarios. The analysis
supports enforcement actions based on a strong threshold
presumption of a relationship of trust and confidence in
spousal relations, as recognized by the SEC through its
adoption of Rule 10b5-2(b)(3). This support derives from
a focus on two fundamental building blocks of spousal
misappropriation cases—a broad understanding of
deception as it is relevant to these cases and longstanding
accepted sociolegal wisdom on the nature of marital
relationships
as
evidenced
in
the
spousal
communications privilege.
Simply put, marriage is a relationship of trust and
confidence; to the extent a spouse’s breach of that trust
or confidence is deceptive and occurs in connection with
the purchase or sale of securities, the breach should be
deemed to provide a basis for insider trading
enforcement. Market integrity is damaged through
marital deception in the same way that it is damaged
through the deception by an attorney of a client or the
attorney’s law firm partners. Market actors depend on
the confidentiality of information shared in marriages as
well as information shared in attorney-client
relationships and partnerships.
Nonetheless, spousal misappropriation cases
raise other questions that remain unanswered. In
particular, many traits of the individual spouses involved
in alleged spousal misappropriation are unknown, and
the motives for marital breaches of trust and confidence
in spousal misappropriation cases are unclear. We do not
know much at all from publicly available information, for
example, about the spouses who engage in
misappropriation (or conduct that may constitute
misappropriation) under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
Other than their gender, are there particular attributes
of these marital partners that make them more likely to
be subject to or engage in alleged or actual spousal
misappropriation? Also, publicly available information
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gives us little information about why a spouse would
engage in securities trading while possessing, or tip
another about, material nonpublic information
faithlessly or faithfully obtained through the marital
relationship. Is the conduct always directed toward
making money, or is there some other benefit or
detriment that we may not recognize or properly weigh
in understanding behavioral motivations or other
instrumental causes? The gathering, assembly, and
analysis of information of this kind would require an
empirical study of spousal misappropriation cases and
their participants that is beyond the scope of this
article—but within the scope of the overall research
agenda of this author and others. Only with more
information about spousal information sources, spousal
misappropriators, and the motivations of spousal
misappropriators can we determine whether U.S. insider
trading regulation is properly calibrated to deter
unwanted behaviors and incentivize compliance.
It is important to recognize that the current basis
of U.S. insider trading liability—as a part of the doctrine
of securities fraud—underlies the need for proving
deception in spousal misappropriation and other
contexts. Indeed, U.S. insider trading regulation is
opaque and complex. Many have suggested that the
regulation of insider trading in the United States would
be more coherent if federal regulators (legislative and
administrative) rewrote it from scratch with a clear
policy foundation and accountability to market theory.148
See, e.g., Bruce W. Klaw, Why Now Is the Time to Statutorily
Ban Insider Trading Under the Equality of Access Theory, 7
WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 275, 345 (2016) (proposing “a new
statutory provision in the United States that will define insider
trading under an ‘equality of access’ theory”); Andrew W.
Marrero, Insider Trading: Inside the Quagmire, 17 BERKELEY
BUS. L.J. 234, 234 (2020) (recommending the adoption of “a
statutory framework prohibiting insider trading on the basis of
knowing possession of material nonpublic information . . .
148
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Most note that a legislative codification of insider trading
is doubtful (at best).149 Some have suggested deregulating
insider trading entirely.150 These proposals are
acknowledged and appreciated, although their validity
and desirability depend on a deeper understanding of
market participants and their behaviors that continues
to be developed.
This article therefore represents only a start—but
an
important
one—in
understanding
spousal
misappropriation liability and its role in shaping insider
trading regulation. It offers information useful to courts,
enforcement agents, and regulators, as well as market
actors and their legal counsel, as they interpret and apply
existing legal doctrine and policy to spousal
misappropriation as a recurrent type of insider trading
context. Limited changes to insider trading law may
result from these interpretations and applications.
situated under the strict liability principle embodied in Section
16 of the 1934 Act”).
149 See, e.g., John F. Olson et al., Recent Insider Trading
Developments: The Search for Clarity, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 715,
738 (1991) (“[T]he law of insider trading is likely to continue to
develop through case decisions, not by legislative definition.”);
Robert Steinbuch, Mere Thieves, 67 MD. L. REV. 570, 613–14
(2008) (“Almost every other country that prohibits insider
trading uses statutes that specifically define the relevant
terms. . . . Only the United States refuses to legislatively define
its terms, allowing the judiciary significant discretion in
developing the prohibition against insider trading. [F]uture
legislative action seems unlikely.” (footnotes omitted)).
150 See, e.g., HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE
STOCK MARKET (1966) (arguing that unregulated insider
trading, absent fraudulent misrepresentation, creates market
efficiencies and represents compensation to insiders); Dennis
W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider
Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857, 861 (1983) (assessing the
rationales for insider trading regulation and suggesting the
deregulation of insider trading as an efficient means of
compensating corporate management).
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However, until quantitative and qualitative empirical
work, including potentially ethnographic studies, reveal
more about the actors involved in the information
exchanges and securities transactions comprising
spousal misappropriation, more comprehensive law
reform efforts—those addressing, for example, the root
causes or deterrents of spousal misappropriation—must
wait for another day.
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